Rule 11 and Federal Sovereign Immunity:
Respecting the Explicit Waiver
Requirement
Timothy J. Simeonet
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 requires courts to impose
sanctions on attorneys or represented parties who file signed papers that are not well-grounded in law and fact or are interposed
for improper purposes. 1 Rule 11 does not specify the precise penalty to be imposed, but rather delegates to the courts the authority
to fashion an "appropriate sanction."'2 Monetary sanctions, especially awards of attorneys' fees, have become the Rule 11 sanction
of choice.3
During the years after the adoption of the new Rule 11 in
1983, sanctions were rarely assessed against the United States or
its attorneys.4 Today, however, increasing numbers of courts are
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1

FRCP 11 states:

Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney
shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name,
whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign
the party's pleading, motion, or other paper and state the party's address.... The
signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer
has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact
and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless
it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or
movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the
court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed
it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to
pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
2

Id.

See Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensationand Punishment,74 Georgetown L J
1313, 1333 (1986) (costs and attorneys' fees were the only penalties awarded in 96 percent of
the Rule 11 cases studied).
4 This Comment considers only Rule 11 sanctions imposed against the federal government. The complicated issues of state government immunity from attorneys' fee awards
3
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moving toward parity in their treatment of the federal government
and private litigants under Rule 11. 5 Unfortunately, the opinions
of these courts do not acknowledge the tension between Rule 11
and governmental immunities.6
Although Rule 11 establishes that either the government, its
attorneys, or both may be sanctioned,7 the courts have not recognized that sanctioning the government and sanctioning its attorneys raise two different, albeit related, sets of issues. This Comment argues that distinguishing these situations will enable the
district courts to control the government's trial behavior without
contravening
the Supreme
Court's
sovereign
immunity
jurisprudence.
The first situation, sanctioning the government, raises important sovereign immunity questions that the courts are beginning to
acknowledge, but have failed to analyze adequately. The government's claim is simple: sovereign immunity prevents courts from
assessing attorneys' fees against the federal government unless it
waives its immunity." Yet the lower courts, perhaps fearing that
the government's trial behavior would otherwise be unregulable,
have rejected this claim.9
Section I of this Comment argues that, despite lower court decisions to the contrary, the government has never waived its sovereign immunity in the context of Rule 11. An increasingly, and perhaps unreasonably, severe body of Supreme Court precedent
repeatedly insists that waivers of sovereign immunity be explicit.10
The lower courts have either circumvented this requirement with
manufactured waivers" or have imposed Rule 11 sanctions against

under Rule 11 lie beyond the scope of this Comment. See generally Note, Congressional
Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity, 86 Colum L Rev 1436 (1986).
5 See John Mulligan, Rule 11: Should Sanctions Be Imposed Against the Government
and Its Attorneys in Federal Tax Cases? A Review and Critique of Mattingly v. United
States, 5 Georgetown J Legal Ethics 613 (1992).
6 "Governmental immunities" include sovereign immunity and official immunities, both
limited and absolute.
7 Rule 11 allows the court to "impose [sanctions] upon the person who signed [the paper], a represented party, or both." In a suit involving the government, the government
agency or department is itself the "represented party." This Comment employs the term
"the government" as shorthand for the variety of federal government litigants that have
raised sovereign immunity questions in the Rule 11 context.
8 See Ruckelshaus v SierraClub, 463 US 680, 685 (1983), citing Alyeska Pipeline Co. v
Wilderness Society, 421 US 240, 267-68 (1975).
o See text accompanying notes 57-88.
10 See text accompanying notes 16-56.
See, for example, Joseph v United States, 121 FRD 406, 413-14 (D Hawaii 1988)
(recognizing that a sovereign immunity waiver must be "explicit," but somehow finding one
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the government without even attempting to find an explicit
waiver. 12 At best, these decisions may be viewed as the handiwork
of federal judges desirous of particular results; at worst, they may
evidence disregard for the regime the Supreme Court has established in the area of sovereign immunity.
The second situation, sanctioning the government's attorneys
personally, raises a different set of problems. Occasionally, there
are cases where sovereign immunity prevents a suit from proceeding against a government officer," and there may be cases in which
a government attorney might benefit from either absolute or limited government officer immunity.1 4 The purposes of Rule 11, however, and the rule's emphasis on the personal responsibilities of attorneys, all point toward a different result. Section II of this
Comment analyzes these problems and concludes that neither sovereign immunity nor official immunity should shield the government attorney from Rule 11 sanctions.
Section III brings the distinction between monetary sanctions
on the government itself, and sanctions on the government's attorneys, to bear on how courts might attempt to control the government's trial behavior. This Comment argues that monetary sanctions on individual attorneys and non-monetary sanctions on the
government itself provide adequate control over the government's
trial conduct.

I.

APPLYING RULE

11

TO GOVERNMENT ENTITIES

Rule 11 states that sanctions may be applied against either an
attorney or a "represented party." When a government agency or
department is involved in litigation, it falls within the scope of
Rule 11 sanctions under the "represented party" provision." Gov-

anyway in the government's consent to a suit in a court in which Rule 11 applies); Adamson
v Bowen, 855 F2d 668, 671 (10th Cir 1988) (finding an explicit waiver in the Equal Access to
Justice Act); In re Good Hope Industries, Inc., 886 F2d 480, 482 (1st Cir 1989) (citing
Adamson with approval).
Is See, for example, Mattingly v United States, 939 F2d 816, 818 (9th Cir 1991) (concluding that "[t]he government is not immune from Rule 11 sanctions" without addressing
an explicit waiver requirement). See also United States v Gavilan Joint Community College
District, 849 F2d 1246, 1251 (9th Cir 1988) (not mentioning an explicit waiver requirement,
but stating monetary sanctions against the government may be awarded under Rule 11).
iS See text accompanying notes 96-105.
"4The courts have not addressed this problem, and have thus far simply imposed sanctions on the government itself.
15 See Trout v Garrett, 780 F Supp 1396, 1428 (D DC 1991) ("Rule 11 sanctions may
lawfully be imposed not only upon the signing attorney but also upon the 'represented
party.' The parties represented by Justice counsel in this case are technically the Secretary
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ernment litigants assert, however, that while they may fall within
the ambit of Rule 11, sovereign immunity nonetheless protects
them from monetary sanctions. To decide whether this claim is
correct, the first step is to examine the Supreme Court's sovereign
immunity waiver jurisprudence.
Waiver of Federal Sovereign Immunity in the Supreme Court

A.

The early history of federal sovereign immunity in the United
States remains the subject of considerable academic debate. For
example, scholars still disagree concerning the doctrine's precise
source.1 6 But for purposes of this Comment these questions are
largely irrelevant; whatever its source, the basic principle that the
United States must consent to suit has gone unchallenged for
nearly one hundred and fifty years.
The United States's sovereign immunity has, however, been
cut back considerably by waivers and judicial decisions. Most importantly, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) now provides a
clear waiver of federal sovereign immunity for non-pecuniary
claims. 17 Unfortunately, in the many situations that do involve
monetary judgments against the United States, it remains difficult
to determine whether Congress has waived the government's sovereign immunity. Often it is unclear how far an apparent waiver was

of the Navy and the Commander of NARDAC, but in reality the party is the Department of
the Navy.").
16 Some have suggested that the Constitution contains the principle of federal sovereign
immunity. See, for example, Kennecott Copper Corp. v State Tax Comm., 327 US 573, 580
(1946) (Frankfurter dissenting) (sovereign immunity is "embodied in the Constitution");
Note, How Well Can States Enforce Their Environmental Laws When the Polluter is the
United States Government?, 18 Rutgers L J 123, 129 (1986) (suggesting that federal sover*eign immunity springs from the Supremacy Clause). Compare Federalist 81 (Hamilton), in
Clinton Rossiter, ed, The FederalistPapers481, 487 (Mentor, 1961) (sovereign immunity is
part of the "general practice of mankind").
Other commentators believe that sovereign immunity is a common law principle borrowed from the English tradition. See, for example, Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 9.2.1 at 470 (Little, Brown, 1989). Under this view, the "source" of U.S. government
sovereign immunity is probably Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Cohens v Virginia, 19
US (6 Wheat) 264, 411-12 (1821) ("The universally received opinion is, that no suit can be
commenced or prosecuted against the United States ... .
17

The APA states:

An action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money damages and
stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in
an official capacity ... shall not be dismissed ... on the ground that it is against the
United States.
5 USC § 702 (1988). The Ex Parte Young fiction also allows non-monetary relief against the
government. See text accompanying note 101.
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intended to extend, or even whether one was intended at all. The
Rule 11 setting presents one such predicament.
The Supreme Court has offered general guidelines for determining whether, in a particular context, Congress has waived the
United States's immunity to money damages. As early as 1927, the
Court had already established that waivers of sovereign immunity
must be clearly expressed and narrowly construed. In Eastern
TransportationCo. v United States," the Court wrote: "The sovereignty of the United States raises a presumption against its suability, unless it is clearly shown; nor should a court enlarge its liability to suit beyond what the language requires." 19
Early cases following Eastern Transportation applied these
apparently strict requirements with some leniency. 20 More recent
Court decisions, however, view the "unequivocal expression" standard enunciated in Eastern Transportation,far more narrowly."
In 1983, for example, the Court decided Ruckelshaus v Sierra
Club,22 involving whether attorneys' fees could be awarded in an
action against the federal government under § 307(f) of the Clean
Air Act absent some degree of success on the merits by the claimant. The language at issue in the case provided that the court
could award reasonable attorneys' fees in suits challenging emission standards promulgated under the Act "whenever
it deter2' 3
mines that such an award [would be] appropriate.

The D.C. Circuit had found that although all of claimants'
substantive claims were rejected, an award of fees was still "require[d]" for their contributions to the goals of the Clean Air
Act.24 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that sovereign immu-

nity prohibited the appellate court's award because § 307(f) did
not provide the explicit waiver of immunity necessary to impose
Is 272

US 675 (1927).
19 Id at 686.
20 See, for example, CanadianAviator, Ltd. v United States, 324 US 215, 222-23 (1945)
(stating "[c]ongressional adoption of broad statutory language authorizing suit was deliberate and is not to be thwarted by an unduly restrictive interpretation"); Indian Towing Co.,
Inc. v United States, 350 US 61, 68-69 (1955) (acknowledging that the Federal Tort Claims
Act could be read to disallow recovery against the United States, but holding that the Court
should not "import immunity back into a statute designed to limit it").
21 See Irwin v Veterans Administration, 498 US 89, 95 (1990), citing United States v
Mitchell, 445 US 535, 538 (1980), in turn quoting United States v King, 395 US 1, 4 (1969)
(distilling the holding of Eastern Transportationand other early cases to an "unequivocal
expression" standard).
22 463 US 680 (1983).
20 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub L No 95-95, 91 Stat 685, 777 (Aug 7, 1977),
codified at 42 USC § 7607(f) (1988).
2" Sierra Club v Gorsuch, 672 F2d 33, 41 (DC Cir 1982).
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fees on the government.2 5 The Court emphasized the strictness of
the waiver standard: "Waivers of sovereign immunity must be
'construed strictly in favor of the sovereign.'
t then concluded
t26
that "care must be taken not to 'enlarge' § 307(f)'s waiver of immunity beyond what a fair reading of the language of the section
'2 7
requires.
The very next paragraph in the opinion, however, arguably
concedes that a "fair reading" of the language of § 307(f) might
indeed "require" the court to find a waiver of immunity. The
Court found it necessary to reach well beyond the language of the
statute for some rather abstract arguments to justify its holding:
[W]e fail to find in § 307(f) the requisite indication that Congress meant to abandon historic fee-shifting principles and intuitive notions of fairness when it enacted the section. Instead, we believe that the term "appropriate" modifies but
does not completely reject the traditional rule that a fee
claimant must "prevail" before it may recover attorneys' fees.
This result is the most reasonable interpretation of congressional intent.2 8
The Court's reliance on congressional intent and "intuitive notions
of fairness" to avoid recognizing a waiver of sovereign immunity
suggests that even if an "unequivocal expression" of a waiver could
reasonably be found in a statute, the Court today may be unwilling
to find it.
Several more recent waiver cases also support the view that
the Court has toughened the "unequivocal expression" standard.
The first, Ardestani v INS,2 9 involved a claim by an Iranian who
had prevailed in administrative deportation proceedings and then
brought suit to recover attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to
Justice Act (EAJA).30 The Eleventh Circuit, narrowly construing
the EAJA's waiver of sovereign immunity, held that the EAJA
does not apply to administrative
deportation proceedings, 31 and
2
affirmed.
Court
the Supreme

28 Ruckelshaus, 463 US at 685-86.
26 Id at 685, citing McMahon v United States, 342 US 25, 27 (1951).

463 US at 686.
Id.
29 112 S Ct 515 (1991).
11 See 5 USC § 504 (1988) and 28 USC § 2412 (1988).
3 Ardestani v INS, 904 F2d 1505 (11th Cir 1990).
32 Ardestani, 112 S Ct at 518.
27
28
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The Court was called upon to construe several related statutory provisions. The EAJA provides that "[a]n agency that conducts an adversary adjudication shall award, to a prevailing party
other than the United States, fees and other expenses incurred by
that party in connection with that proceeding."33 It then defines an
"adversary adjudication" as "an adjudication under section 554 of
[the Administrative Procedure Act] in which the position of the
United States is represented by counsel or otherwise."3 4 Section
554, in turn, defines the scope of an "adjudication." 35
Ardestani contended that, given the relationship between
these provisions, the text of § 504 could reasonably be interpreted
as encompassing all proceedings conforming to the definition of
"adjudication" offered in § 554, even if the proceeding were not
otherwise governed by § 554. She cited the legislative history of
the EAJA to bolster her interpretation. The Court countered that
the legislative history could not be allowed to "undercut the ordinary understanding of the statutory language.

3

7

In addition, the

Court argued, the "limited nature of waivers of sovereign immunity" militated against permitting an attorneys' fee award.3 8 Citing
Ruckelshaus, the Court repeated its view that a "waiver must be
strictly construed in favor of the United States,"3 and held that
this rule may not be bent even to accommodate congressional
intent:
We have no doubt that the broad purposes of the EAJA
would be served by making the statute applicable to deportation proceedings..

. . But we cannot extend the EAJA to ad-

ministrative deportation proceedings when the plain language
of the statute, coupled with the strict construction of waivers
of sovereign immunity, constrain us to do otherwise.40
In short, the RuckeIshaus Court invoked congressional intent to
demonstrate that a waiver of sovereign immunity was not intended, and then the Ardestani Court held that intent is unavailable to demonstrate that a waiver was intended.
3

5 USC § 504(a)(1).

- 5 USC § 504(b)(1)(C)(i).
35 Section 554 is lengthy, and the precise contours of the definition it offers are not
relevant here. Indeed, for the purposes of this Comment, it matters little whether
Ardestani's case was an "adjudication" under § 554 or not.
31 Ardestani, 112 S Ct at 520.

37Id.
Id.
39 Id.
40 Id at 521.
18
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Later in the same term, in United States v Nordic Village,
Inc.,"' the Court extended the reasoning of Ardestani a step further, making it still more difficult to find a waiver of sovereign immunity. In Nordic Village, the issue was whether a bankruptcy
trustee could enforce a monetary judgment against the IRS for
funds that had been illicitly transferred to the IRS. 42 The Court
held that sovereign
immunity rendered the judgment
unenforceable. 3
Nordic Village turned on the construction of § 106(c) of the
Bankruptcy Code, which states:
(c) Except as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section and notwithstanding any assertion of sovereign
immunity(1) a provision of this title that contains "creditor", "entity", or "governmental unit" applies to governmental
units; and
(2) a determination by the court of an issue arising under
such a provision binds governmental units.4
The Court held that although § 106(c) "waives sovereign immunity, it fails to establish unambiguously that the waiver extends to
monetary claims. It is susceptible of at least two interpretations
45
that do not authorize monetary relief.'
The Court first suggested that the two parts of § 106(c) could
be read complementarily, rather than independently. Under this
reading, the first paragraph only "identifies" the subject matter
that courts may entertain under the statute, while the second paragraph "specifies the manner in which there shall be applied to governmental units the provisions identified by the first paragraph,
i.e., a manner that permits declaratory or injunctive relief but not
an affirmative monetary recovery.' 46 Second, the Court proposed
that "[e]xcept as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section" could be read to mean that those subsections provide the exclusive remedy for a certain subclass of cases that they address. 7
The Court did not explain this reading, nor did Justice Scalia, the
author of the opinion, describe either of these "plausible" interpre-

42

112 S Ct 1011 (1992).

42

Id at 1013.

43
44
46

46
47

Id at 1017.
11 USC § 106(c) (1988).
112 S Ct at 1015.
Id.
Id at 1016.
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tations as a "plain language" reading of the statute. As Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent, they are, at best, imaginative. 48
Justice Scalia also went on to make explicit Ardestani's implicit requirement that an "unequivocal expression" of a sovereign
immunity waiver appear in the actual text of the statute in question. He wrote: "[T]he 'unequivocal expression' of elimination of
sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an expression in statutory text. If clarity does not exist there, it cannot be supplied by a
committee report. '49 Thus, Nordic Village suggests that the "unambiguous expression" inquiry asks whether the actual statutory
language in question admits of any "plausible interpretation" that
would avoid waiving sovereign immunity.
The Court's most recent major sovereign immunity decision,
United States Department of Energy v Ohio,50 confirmed that the
Nordic Village approach is now the standard. In Ohio, the Court
was obliged to decide whether certain sections of the Clean Water
Act (CWA)"' or the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 52
waived sovereign immunity from liability for civil fines imposed by
a state against the federal government for past violations of these
acts. Ohio claimed that several sections of these statutes clearly
waived sovereign immunity. The most illustrative of these is
§ 1323(a) of the CWA, which states:
[T]he Federal Government... shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements,
administrative authority, and process and sanctions . . . in
the same manner . . . as any nongovernmental entity ....
[T]he United States shall be liable only for those civil penalties arising under Federal law or imposed by a State or local
53
court to enforce an order or the process of such court.
The Court found that "sanctions" in the first sentence of the section encompassed only coercive fines, and did not extend to civil
liability for past infractions. 4 It admitted that this rendered the
"civil penalties" clause of the second sentence meaningless, but
speculated:

41

Id at 1018-19 (Stevens dissenting).
at 1016.

49 Id

50 112 S Ct 1627 (1992).

33 USC § 1251 et seq (1988).
5242 USC § 6901 et seq (1988).
53 33 USC § 1323(a).
112 S Ct at 1636-37.
5
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Perhaps [Congress] used ["civil penalties"] just in case some
later amendment might waive the government's immunity
from punitive sanctions. Perhaps a drafter mistakenly thought
that liability for such sanctions had somehow been waived already. Perhaps someone was careless. The question has no
satisfactory answer. 5
The Court's reading is less than compelling. In dissent, Justice
White observed that "rather than reading the CWA as Congress
wrote it and recognizing that it effects a waiver of immunity, the
majority engages in speculation about why Congress could not
have meant what it unambiguously said." 56 Although Justice
White's comment was aimed at the Ohio majority, it is probably
also an accurate description of the explicit waiver standard under
Nordic Village. In effect, the test is that if a plausible story may be
told that would avoid recognizing a waiver, the Court will adopt
that "speculation" as the statute's meaning.
B. Applying the Explicit Waiver Requirement in the Rule 11
Context
The language of Rule 11 does not contain an "explicit waiver"
of sovereign immunity. Indeed, the text does not include any reference to the government, or to sovereign immunity.5 7 Therefore,
under the Supreme Court's exacting "unequivocal expression"
standard, monetary sanctions under Rule 11 should not apply to a
government agency or department involved in litigation. It is thus
somewhat. unsettling to note that no court has ever reached this
seemingly obvious conclusion. In fact, until 1988, the courts simply
ignored the issue entirely.58 Since then, they have failed to put
forth a convincing argument as to why sovereign immunity should
not bar monetary sanctions under Rule 11 against the government.

"

Id at 1639.

56

Id at 1643.

See note 1.
See, for example, Larkin v Heckler, 584 F Supp 512, 513-14 (N D Cal 1984) (imposing Rule 11 sanctions on the government without considering sovereign immunity issues);
Adamson v Bowen, 855 F2d 668, 670 (10th Cir 1988) (observing that "[tihe courts have not
discussed the specific issue whether the United States has waived immunity from monetary
sanctions under Rule 11").
67

"
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1. Rules Enabling Act.
In Barry v Bowen,59 the Ninth Circuit tentatively suggested
one theory under which to find a waiver of sovereign immunity in
the Rule 11 context. The issue actually confronting the Barry court
was whether sovereign immunity precluded a district court from
using its contempt powers to impose a monetary sanction on the
government for late payment of an attorneys' fees award under the
EAJA. The court concluded that it did. Along the way, however, in
an attempt to distinguish Barry from an earlier Ninth Circuit case
permitting sanctions to issue against the government under Rule
11, e0 the court wrote that the "rule making procedure which involves Congress perhaps can be viewed as an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity.""1
The EAJA text cited by the Barry court-28 USC
§ 2072(a)-simply does not support its argument. The most relevant language states only that the "Supreme Court shall have the
power to prescribe by general rules

. . .

practice and procedure."62

In no way does this appear to address sovereign immunity or governmental liability. One can only speculate that the Ninth Circuit
may have wished to imply that the Rules Enabling Act (REA) is
evidence of Congress's intent to waive sovereign immunity as to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. At the risk of belaboring the
obvious, however, this does not meet the "unequivocal expression"
requirement enunciated in Nordic Village.
Moreover, the second subsection of § 2072 cuts directly
against the Barry court's suggestion. Section 2072(b) states that
the "rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right." Perhaps the most influential discussion of the term "substantive right" is John Hart Ely's in his article The Irrepressible
Myth of Erie. 3 Professor Ely wrote that a substantive right is "a
right granted for one or more nonprocedural reasons, for some purpose or purposes not having to do with the fairness or efficiency of
the litigation process. ' ' 64 While the rationale for sovereign immu-

nity, be it history or policy, remains elusive, it is clear that the

" 884 F2d 442 (9th Cir 1989).

United States v Gavilan Community College Dist., 849 F2d 1246 (9th Cir 1988).
11 Barry, 884 F2d at 444, citing 28 USC § 2072 (1988).
62 28 USC § 2072.
'3 87 Harv L Rev 693 (1974).
" Id at 725. See also Black's Law Dictionary 1429 (West, 6th ed 1990) (defining a
"substantive right" as a "right to the equal enjoyment of fundamental rights, privileges and
immunities; distinguished from a procedural right").
60
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purpose of the immunity is not to ensure the "fairness or efficiency
of the litigation process." Sovereign immunity therefore falls
squarely within the category of "substantive rights," which may
not, by the very terms of § 2072, be abridged by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.65 Far from providing a waiver of sovereign immunity, the REA, if anything, buttresses the government's claim. 66
2.

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

6
A second Ninth Circuit opinion, Mattingly v United States,
proposed another tack that may justify applying Rule 11 sanctions
to the government. Mattingly suggested that rather than looking
to the REA, the courts 6could
find a waiver of sovereign immunity
8
in the rules themselves.
According to the Mattingly court, Rules 1 and 81 establish
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "apply by their own
force to all litigants before the court."6 9 To support this contention, the court cited Rule 1, which provides that the "rules govern
the procedure in the United States district courts in all suits of a
civil nature.170 This language, the court implied, must be read as
including suits against the United States. The court also argued
that Rule 81 lists circumstances under which the rules do not apply, without exempting suits involving the United States, and thus
supports applying monetary sanctions to the government under
71
Rule 11.
Like the Barry court's REA theory, the FRCP justification
does not come close to satisfying the explicit waiver test enunciated by the Supreme Court. Nowhere in the text of the rules does
it say that the government waives any part of its sovereign
immunity.
In addition, the government's sovereign immunity defense
does not, as Mattingly would suggest, render any portion of the
7

65 But see Joseph v United States, 121 FRD 406, 414 (D Hawaii 1988) (stating that "an
award of fees in this context is more a matter of procedure than substance," but offering no
authority or explanation for how this could be so).
68 See also Sibbach v Wilson & Co., 312 US 1, 14 (1940) (holding that a rule is not
substantive for REA purposes if "the rule really regulates ... the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy
and redress for disregard or infraction of them").
67 939 F2d 816 (9th Cir 1991).
68 Id at 818.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71

Id.
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Rules inoperative. It is consistent with the texts of both Rule 1 and
Rule 11 to say that the rules "govern procedure" in all civil suits,
including those involving the United States as a litigant, and yet
admit that sovereign immunity prevents applying monetary sanctions under Rule 11 to the federal government. For Rule 11 does
not mandate monetary sanctions, but delegates to the district
court the discretion to fashion an "appropriate sanction." Although sovereign immunity renders monetary sanctions "inappropriate" under Rule 11, a spectrum of non-monetary sanctions remain available to the district court, and Rule 11 retains its
"governing" force. 2
This reading of Rule 11 not only respects the Supreme Court's
sovereign immunity jurisprudence, but also Congress's REA mandate that the rules "shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. ' 73 It simply would not make sense to read the rules

as the Mattingly court suggests, in clear contravention of the enabling statute. 4 In short, there is no plausible argument that the
rules themselves effect a waiver of sovereign immunity under the
Supreme Court's explicit waiver standard.
3. Equal Access to Justice Act.
The third justification courts have offered for applying monetary sanctions to the government under Rule 11 was elaborated by
the Tenth Circuit in Adamson v Bowen.7 5 Adamson concerned a

disability claimant who had been denied benefits by the Secretary
of Health and Human Services. 7 6 The district court reversed,
found Adamson totally disabled, and imposed Rule 11 sanctions on
the Secretary in the form of Adamson's attorneys' fees.7 7 On ap-

72 See text accompanying notes 153-54; Charles A. Wright and Arthur Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1336 at 117-18 (West, 2d ed 1990) (noting district courts have
great discretion in fashioning a sanction, including reprimands, referral to a judicial
disciplinary board, and dismissal, in addition to monetary sanctions).
73 28 USC § 2072.
74 It is axiomatic that the courts should interpret statutory language to give effect to
the expressed intent of Congress. See, for example, Chevron v Natural Resources Council,
Inc., 467 US 837, 842 (1984) ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter.").
75 855 F2d 668 (10th Cir 1988).
76

Id at 670.

As in most Social Security cases, the Tenth Circuit's opinion speaks of applying sanctions to "the Secretary," but its EAJA argument clearly concerns the liability of the United
States. See id. The courts use "the Secretary" as shorthand for the Department of Health
and Human Services, and do not mean the Secretary in his individual capacity as a government officer.
7
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peal, the Tenth Circuit rejected the Secretary's argument that sovereign immunity was a complete defense to monetary sanctions
against the United States under Rule 11.78
The Adamson court held that the EAJA effected a waiver of
sovereign immunity. The court wrote: "[u]nder § 2412(b) of the
EAJA, the United States is liable for attorneys' fees 'to the same
extent that any other party would be liable under the common law
or under the terms of any statute which specifically provides for
such an award.' "7 The court claimed that "[tihis section ...
would appear on its face to be sufficiently broad to waive the government's immunity from fee awards pursuant to the [federal
rules]." ' 0 It explained that while the rules do not appear in the
language of the EAJA, they are impliedly included because they
have "the force of a federal statute."8 1
The Adamson court also relied heavily on the legislative history of the EAJA to support its claim that sovereign immunity did
not bar an award of attorneys' fees under Rule 11. It pointed out
that Congress had amended FRCP 37(f), governing discovery sanctions, to remove an exemption for the United States.82 Through
this action, the court argued, Congress "manifested its broader intent that the United States be subject to fee sanctions under all of
the federal rules to the same extent as private parties." 83
There are several problems with the Adamson court's analysis.
Again, like the other theories for applying Rule 11 to the government, it fails to conform to the explicit waiver standard established
by the Supreme Court. The Court's Nordic Village and Ohio decisions demonstrate that the relevant question in determining
whether a statute waives sovereign immunity is not whether the
statute could, or even should, reasonably be interpreted as doing
so. Rather, the Court's "plausible interpretation" test inquires
whether the statute could be construed as not waiving sovereign
immunity. In the EAJA context, such an interpretation is surely
plausible; the "plain language" of the EAJA does not mention the
FRCP, but only states that the United States shall be liable for
'84
fees under the "common law or any ... statute.

78

79

Id at 671.
Id.

80 Id.

81Id, citing Sibbach v Wilson & Co., 312 US 1, 13 (1941).
82 855 F2d at 671, citing HR Rep No 1418, 96th Cong, 2d Sess 19 (1980).
83 855 F2d at 671.
8

28 USC § 2412(b).
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A second, and still more damaging, objection to Adamson
would remain even if a consensus were to emerge that the EAJA
does waive sovereign immunity. The Adamson court simply ignored the first half of § 2412(b): "a court may award reasonable
fees and expenses of attorneys ...

to the prevailingparty. 85 As

the Mattingly court pointed out, the EAJA could not possibly support Rule 11 sanctions against the United States when the government wins on the merits. 6
Therefore, while one might at least argue that the EAJA provides a waiver of sovereign immunity from Rule 11 sanctions when
the government loses on the merits, it would be patently ridiculous
to suppose that the EAJA waives sovereign immunity from Rule 11
as a general matter. And, since the EAJA itself authorizes attorneys' fees awards when the government loses, Adamson's argument
that it might also be read to waive immunity to Rule 11 would be
irrelevant, even if true.
Finally, the bulk of the Adamson court's argument supporting
its interpretation of § 2412(b) was drawn from the legislative history of the EAJA. Yet under Nordic Village, legislative history has
no bearing on the waiver issue.87 "[T]he unequivocal expression of
elimination of sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an expression in statutory text."88
4. Policy arguments for finding a waiver.
It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that Rule 11 provides
no waiver of sovereign immunity under the Supreme Court's recent
jurisprudence. Nonetheless, one could imagine policy arguments
which conclude this is simply the wrong result. Indeed, although
the courts have not generally offered policy justifications for their
decisions in this area, the implication is clear that policy concerns
underlie their positions.
The policy argument would presumably be made on two levels.
First, as a practical matter, Rule 11 immunity would permit the
government's trial behavior to go unregulated. Second, one might
worry that confining Rule 11 with the law of sovereign immunity,
and thus prohibiting monetary awards, prevents innocent victims

s5
8
'7
9

855
See
See
112

F2d at 671 (emphasis added).
939 F2d at 819.
text accompanying notes 48-49.
S Ct at 1016.
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of impermissible government pleading practices from being made
whole. " '
Fortunately, these fears are insubstantial. Monetary sanctions
under Rule 11 are not the only means available to discipline the
government's trial behavior. The courts can always apply nonmonetary sanctions to the government under Rule 11.90 In addition, the courts can look beyond Rule 11 and employ a variety of
other methods to control the government's trial behavior. 9 1 Finally,
as Section II of this Comment demonstrates, the district courts are
92
free to impose monetary sanctions on the government's attorneys.
All of these techniques could be employed without unnecessarily
contravening the settled law of sovereign immunity.
The second policy argument is no more persuasive. First, compensation generally is available to victims of governmental abuses
at trial.9 Second, to the limited extent that the objection is true, it
fails to comprehend the very nature of sovereign immunity. A basic
feature of sovereign immunity is precisely that injured parties do
remain uncompensated.9 4 Certainly this fact is unfortunate, often
even unpalatable, and strongly supports reevaluating the policies
behind sovereign immunity.9 5 This, however, is a matter for Congress, not the courts. For courts to begin holding that there has
been a waiver of sovereign immunity when there has not been an
explicit waiver would only cause needless confusion.

89 Ninety-six percent of all sanctions assessed under Rule 11 are attorneys' fee awards.
See Nelken, 74 Georgetown L J at 1333 (cited in note 3). Nelken also summarizes the debate
over the "real" purpose of Rule 11, including consideration of its possible compensatory
function. Id at 1323-25. See also Wright and Miller, Federal Practiceand Procedure § 1332
at 26-29 (cited in note 72).
:0 See text accompanying note 17.
91 See text accompanying notes 143-55.
92 See text accompanying notes 96-142.
9' The EAJA, of course, is the most obvious means by which a litigant may receive a
monetary award against the government.
94 Consider, for example, Ardestani, 112 S Ct 515, in which no one doubted that the
plaintiff deserved to be reimbursed for her attorneys' fees.
"
A number of commentators have urged that the doctrine be eliminated entirely, and
perhaps they are correct. See David P. Currie, Sovereign Immunity and Suits against Government Officers, 1984 S Ct Rev 149, 168 ("Sovereign immunity is an unattractive doctrine
that does not belong in an enlightened constitution. Unfortunately, however, it is a part of
ours."); Kenneth Culp Davis, Sovereign Immunity Must Go, 22 Admin L Rev 383, 383
(1970) (arguing that sovereign immunity is both unjust and inefficient); Roger C. Cramton,
Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: The Need for Statutory Reform of
Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction,and PartiesDefendant, 68 Mich L Rev
389, 418 (1970) (condemning sovereign immunity as "illogical, confusing, and erratic").
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TO GOVERNMENT ATTORNEYS

Imposing Rule 11 sanctions against a government attorney,
rather than the government itself, raises related, but analytically
distinct, problems. Yet the courts seem oblivious to the distinction.
Research discloses no case discussing the problems raised by the
imposition of sanctions against government attorneys. Courts simply impose sanctions on the government and never reach the analysis outlined below. If, however, the courts take the Supreme
Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence seriously in the context
of Rule 11, the differences in these analyses will become highly relevant. As the discussion below suggests, making appropriate distinctions between the government agency and attorney contexts
would enable the courts to control the government's trial behavior
by sanctioning the government's attorneys without contravening
the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
A. Sovereign Immunity Implications of Applying Rule 11 to Government Attorneys in Their Individual Capacities
Analyzing whether monetary sanctions under Rule 11 may appropriately be levied against government attorneys must also begin
with a look at the relevance of sovereign immunity. At first blush,
it is not clear why this should be so; the name "sovereign immunity" might logically be taken to mean that the doctrine would
only be relevant in suits against the sovereign itself. But, this area
of the law is not so simple. Instead, the Supreme Court has determined that the doctrine of sovereign immunity means that an individual government official "sometimes.
times . . . may not."9

.

. may be sued and some-

There is probably a simple explanation for this confusion.
Since the government may not be sued unless it has waived its immunity, plaintiffs are motivated to search for defendants who are
subject to suit whenever the state is the real object of their ire.
This leads to difficult questions about whether the official really
committed an actionable wrong, or whether the suit is just a clever
way to get at the government.97

" Currie, 1984 S Ct Rev at 149.
97 See The National Association of Attorneys General, Committee on the Office of the
Attorney General, Sovereign Immunity: The Liability of Government and its Officials 12
(1976) ("[T]he threshold question to be determined is whether the suit is in fact against the
official in his individual capacity or against the government.").
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The Supreme Court has made a number of attempts to establish criteria for sorting these two basic categories of cases. The earliest cases, for reasons that were perhaps as much political as judicial, suggested that the division could be made along simplistic,
formal lines. In Osborne v Bank of the United States, for example,
Chief Justice Marshall wrote that sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment was "limited to those suits in which a State
is a party on the record.""8
Not surprisingly, the Court has been obliged to expand considerably the coverage of sovereign immunity from the narrow scope
suggested by Marshall in Osborne. In re Ayers,99 the Court sharply
limited a plaintiff's ability to avoid sovereign immunity by naming
an official, rather than the state, as defendant. Ayers was an action
to enjoin an officer from suing to collect taxes that had already
been paid in interest coupons. The Court wrote that the action
should only be permitted when the official's act entitled the plaintiff "to a remedy . . . against the wrongdoer in his individual
character."' 10 0
This distinction appears to draw a workable line between cases
that are prohibited by sovereign immunity and those that are not.
Since Ayers, however, the Court has pared back the coverage of
sovereign immunity considerably, adding a number of circumstances in which plaintiffs may bring suit against government .officials for wrongs that would appear to be those of the state itself.
Perhaps most familiar is the Ex Parte Young fiction, permitting
suits for injunctive relief to proceed against government officers
even when the behavior complained of is emphatically not the personal act of the individual defendant, but really that of the
state. 10 1 A more recent example appeared in Hutto v Finney, in
which the Court permitted an order for injunctive relief against
02
state officers to include a fee award payable by the state itself.
As Professor Currie writes, the Court has required "officers who
are suable only on the theory that they are not the state to pay
10 3
money that only the state has a duty to pay.'

98 22 US (9 Wheat) 738, 857 (1824). Professor Currie has suggested that Marshall's
opinion in Osborne was an attempt "to sabotage the Eleventh Amendment" and one of his
"least attractive moments." Currie, 1984 S Ct Rev at 168.
9 123 US 443 (1887).
100 Id at 502.
101 209 US 123, 159-60 (1908).
102 437 US 678, 689-93 (1978).
103 Currie, 1984 S Ct Rev at 168.
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The general outline of sovereign immunity has thus changed
considerably since its initial narrow definition in Osborne; first it
was expanded to prohibit suits against officers that are "really"
suits against the state, 10 4 and then narrowed slightly to permit
some suits that do appear to be against the state.105 The landscape
at the frontier between suits that are permitted and suits that are
not thus remains hazy.
Fortunately, however, the Rule 11 scenario with which we are
faced does not lie in that uncertain area. It is an easy case. For
even when the reach of sovereign immunity was greatest, in Ayers,
it clearly would not have extended to a government attorney sanctioned under Rule 11. Following the Ayers reasoning, the question
in the Rule 11 context is whether "the act complained of, considered . . . as the personal act of the individual defendant, constituted a violation."'0 6
The answer is a resounding yes. Imposing Rule 11 sanctions on
a government attorney for a frivolous filing both serves the purposes of Rule 11 and respects the government's sovereign immunity. It would legitimately hold government attorneys to the same
standard that private attorneys face under Rule 11.101 Rule 11 imposes on all individuals who sign papers filed with the court, regardless of who employs the signer, the duty to make a "reasonable
inquiry [to verify that the paper] is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not
interposed for any improper purpose."10 8
This duty has been underscored by a recent pronouncement of
the Supreme Court. The central purpose of Rule 11, the Court
wrote, "is to bring home to the individual signer his personal, nondelegable responsibility . . . . [T]he court expects the signer personally . . . to validate the truth and legal reasonableness of the

0 This is the logical path suggested by Ayers.
"00This is the trend started by Young, and appearing more recently in cases like Hutto
and Quern v Jordan,440 US 332 (1979) (holding that a state official could be ordered to
notify, on behalf of the state, members of a class denied relief by the courts that they could
still
seek administrative relief).
I" Ayers, 123 US at 502.
107 See also Zimmerman v Schweiker, 575 F Supp 1436, 1440 (E D NY 1983) ("Any
ethical and procedural obligation of a private attorney to be fair to opponents and candid
with the court is enforceable when the litigant is represented by an attorney for the
government.").
100FRCP 11.
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papers filed" and "will visit upon him personally. . . its retribution for failing in that responsibility."'10 9
The lower courts have not been slow to incorporate this view
of Rule 11 into their sanction rulings. A number have since explicitly prohibited any reimbursement by the client of a Rule 11 sanction imposed upon an attorney individually. 1 0 For example, the
Second Circuit in Derechin v State University of New York held
that the district court's order forbidding the state from reimbursing its attorney for a Rule 11 sanction, despite a statute entitling
the attorney to reimbursement, was not an abuse of discretion.",
The Second Circuit explained 'that "allowing the sanctioned attorney to shift the burden of the sanction" would undermine the deterrence goal of the Rule and nullify the "personal responsibility"
of the attorney." 2
Thus, while Rule 11 includes the represented party among
those who may be sanctioned, violations of Rule 11 remain emphatically the personal transgressions of signatories, including government attorneys. And, as discussed above, no view of sovereign
immunity would afford government attorneys protection from
sanctions for their personal wrongs.
B.

Government Official Immunity

Before concluding that Rule 11 sanctions may be imposed on
government attorneys, however, one must also consider whether
the attorneys might be shielded by some form of immunity other
than sovereign immunity. Although no court has yet addressed the
argument, the claim might be made that government attorneys are
immune from sanctions levied against them personally on the basis
of an absolute or qualified government official immunity.
Official immunities have developed primarily in the context of

109

Pavelic & LeFlore v Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 US 120, 126-27 (1989). See

also the Advisory Committee Notes to the 1983 Rule 11 amendment, which state that the
"new language is intended to reduce the reluctance of courts to impose sanctions ...
by
emphasizing the responsibilities of the attorney." The Committee also explains that "it is
the attorney whose signature violates the rule." Id.
110 See Borowski v DePuy, Inc., 850 F2d 297, 305 (7th Cir 1988); Huettig & Schromm,
Inc. v Landscape Contractors Council, 582 F Supp 1519, 1522 (N D Cal 1984).
963 F2d 513, 519 (2d Cir 1992).
122

Id.
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§ 1983113 and Bivens suits," 4 which afford a right of action to individuals whose "clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights" 111 have been infringed by state or local officials or by federal officials, respectively. Because § 1983 and the Bivens suits
presented the prospect of dramatically increased liability for public officials, the Court was obliged to decide whether the traditional
common-law immunities that protected public officials applied to
this new class of claims. Although the language of § 1983 makes no
mention of immunities," 6 the Court, drawing on what some commentators see as questionable precedent and public policy concerns, 1 7 decided that modern versions of these common law immunities should apply to both § 1983 and Bivens liability.""
The question, then, is whether a similar route should be taken
in the Rule 11 context. The answer is clearly no. As the following
sections demonstrate, bringing the same analytic framework that
the Supreme Court employed in its § 1983 and Bivens inquiries to
bear on the Rule 11 situation allows one to confidently conclude
that no governmental immunity would be recognized in the Rule
11 context.
1.

Absolute immunity.

The most complete form of government official immunity, absolute immunity, is essentially a privilege that attaches to certain
government positions. "This privilege is absolute and unqualified,

"'
Section 1983 provides: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects
. . . any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law. . . ." 42 USC § 1983 (1988).
114 See Bivens v Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
US 388 (1971) (establishing the federal action analog to § 1983 actions against state and
local officials).
Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US 800, 818 (1982).
's See note 113.
1" Considerable debate surrounds the issue of whether the Court was correct to recognize immunities at all in the § 1983 arena. See generally Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983:
Doctrinal Foundationsand an Empirical Study, 67 Cornell L Rev 482 (1982); Jon 0. Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposalsto Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy
for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 Yale L J 447 (1978). This debate, however, is beyond the
scope of the present Comment.
21 See, for example, Butz v Economou, 438 US 478, 504 (1978). See also Burns v Reed,
111 S Ct 1934, 1945-46 (1991) (Scalia concurring). Though Justice Scalia notes a possible
distinction between the two types of suits, the Court has generally assumed that "the immunities of state officials in § 1983 actions and of federal officials in Bivens actions should be
co-extensive." See Paul M. Bator, et al, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the
Federal System 1293 (Foundation, 3d ed 1988).
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even for acts done with malice or in bad faith . . . ."11" In this
narrow range of circumstances, 2 0 the Court has held that the danger of withholding a remedy from a defendant genuinely wronged
by a government official is outweighed by the public interest promoting the vigorous and fearless performance of her function.12
Officials to whom the Court has clearly extended this protection
include judges, 2 prosecutors,1 2 3 legislators, 2 and the President. 2 5
Deciding whether an official benefits from absolute immunity
in a § 1983 or Bivens action entails a two-part inquiry. First, the
claimed immunity must have been well-established under the common law in analogous situations. 26 Second, its existence must be
compatible with the purposes of recognizing the cause of action
that gave rise to the suit in which the immunity is claimed. 2 7 Absolute immunity for government attorneys under Rule 11 probably
fails on the first count, and certainly on the second.
There is no evidence that an equivalent immunity existed in
the pre-Rule 11 world. Rule 11 consolidated elements from a number of common law pleading practices found in state codes at the
time the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted, the Fed1 28
eral Equity Rules, and English rules under the Judicature Act.
Research discloses no instance in which these antecedents to Rule
11 exempted government attorneys in civil actions from punish119 See The National Association of Attorneys General, Sovereign Immunity at 9 (cited
in note 97).
120 See Forrester v White, 484 US 219, 224 (1988) (the Court has recognized qualified
immunities to avoid expanding the reach of absolute immunity, and has "generally been
quite sparing in its recognition of claims to absolute ... immunity"). For more on qualified
immunities, see text accompanying notes 134-42.
121 This general point has been restated endlessly by courts and commentators; for particularly influential versions, see Imbler v Pachtman,424 US 409, 423 (1976) (protecting a
prosecutor's "independence of judgment [as] required by his public trust"); Gregoirev Biddle, 177 F2d 579, 581 (2d Cir 1949) (Judge Learned Hand, unwilling to "subject those who
try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation," set forth the classic argument for
immunity.).
122 Stump v Sparkman, 435 US 349, 356-57 (1978).
123 Imbler, 424 US at 422-23.
124 Tenney v Brandhove, 341 US 367, 376-77 (1951).
125 Nixon v Fitzgerald,457 US 731, 749 (1982).
12 See Burns, 111 S Ct at 1945 (Scalia concurring) (a common law tradition of immunity is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for absolute immunity in § 1983 actions).
127 See, for example, Gomez v Toledo, 446 US 635, 639 (1980) (the immunity must be
consistent with the purposes of § 1983); Tower v Glover, 467 US 914, 920 (1984) (The Court
will not recognize an immunity available at common law if § 1983's history or purpose counsel against it.). See also David Achtenberg, Immunity Under 42 USC § 1983: Interpretive
Approach and the Search for the Legislative Will, 86 Nw U L Rev 497, 535-36 (1992) (key
to recognizing immunity is whether it would "implement the legislative will").
I28 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice at 9-10 (cited in note 72).
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ment for infractions, nor any in which the government even raised
an immunity issue.
Moreover, absolute immunity for government attorneys under
Rule 11 would simply be incompatible with the major purpose of
the Rule. In substantially its current form, Rule 11 dates only from
1983; at that time Rules 11, 7, 16, and 26 were thoroughly overhauled in response to widespread concern about increasing frivolous litigation and pretrial abuses. 12 9 Rule 11 addressed these
problems by emphasizing the need to improve attorney behavior.13°
In the words of Judge Kaufman of the Second Circuit: "Rule 11
requires that members of the bar avoid haphazard, superficial research. That requirement places the responsibility for properly invoking the power of the court on counsel as officers of the
court.""'3
Another federal judge observed that Rule 11 was intended to
reaffirm that "a lawyer's duty to his or her client cannot be permitted to override his or her duty to the justice system."' 2 Requiring
attorneys to act as responsible officers of the court is a central
tenet of Rule 11, and this policy applies at least as much to government attorneys as to lawyers representing private litigants.
Fortunately, unlike in the sovereign immunity context, policy
matters here; no Supreme Court precedents analogous to the sovereign immunity waiver cases exist to prevent courts from giving
effect to the apparent intent of Congress.' 3
2.

Qualified immunity.

The Court has been wary of the problems extending absolute
immunity too far would pose, recognizing that "[w]hen government
officials abuse their offices, 'action[s] for damages may offer the
only realistic avenue for vindication'" of individual rights.'3 At
the same time, however, the Court has accepted that the "fear of

129Id at 12.
1SOId at 19.
3 InternationalShipping Company v Hydra Offshore, Inc., 875 F2d 388, 393 (2d Cir
1989).
"3 In re Ronco, Inc., 105 FRD 493, 497 (N D
l 1985).
,11In one absolute immunity case, the Supreme Court observed: "[O]ur cases have followed a 'functional' approach to immunity law"; they are only granted when they are necessary to enable an officer to perform her government function. Harlow v Fitzgerald,457 US
800, 810 (1982). This is in stark contrast to the extremely formalistic approach to sovereign
immunity issues described in Section I.
134 Anderson v Creighton, 483 US 635, 638 (1987), citing Harlow, 457 US at 814.
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personal monetary liability and harassing litigation" may "inhibit
officials in the discharge of their duties."' 5
The Court has therefore recognized a category of "qualified"
immunities that avoids extending the scope of traditional absolute
immunity unnecessarily, while shielding from liability those
government officials whose behavior could reasonably have been
thought consistent with the plaintiff's rights. 138 Examining the
Court's test for finding such a limited immunity, however, shows
that qualified immunity would never be recognized in the Rule 11
context.
The landmark case of Harlow v Fitzgerald 37 laid down the
basic elements of the current qualified immunity standard. The
Harlow court first acknowledged that its earlier decisions had generally required government officials only to meet a "good faith"
standard to benefit from a qualified immunity defense. 13 8 The
Court stated, however, that the "substantial costs [that] attend the
litigation of the subjective good faith of government officials" justified a move to an objective standard. 3 9 Therefore, the Court held,
limited immunity would henceforth be available only to officials
whose actions did not "violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
40
known.'
Later cases have confirmed that the Harlow standard of objective reasonableness is the key to attaining qualified immunity.'4 '
For this reason, a qualified immunity to Rule 11 sanctions would
be nonsensical. If an attorney conducts a "reasonable" inquiry
before filing papers with the court, she will not be subject to Rule
11 sanctions. And if she does not act reasonably in the Rule 11
context, it seems unlikely that her behavior could be "reasonable"
for the purpose of attaining a qualified immunity. In other words,

131Anderson, 483 US at 638.
138 See id at 638-39. See also Note, Qualified Immunity for Civil Rights Violations:

Refining the Standard, 75 Cornell L Rev 462, 470 (1990).
137 457 US 800 (1982).
138 Id at 815. Harlow was not a § 1983 action, but an action under the Constitution;
however, Court decisions have established that "there is no difference between liability...
under § 1983 and liability of federal officers under the Constitution." Paul T. Hardy and J.
Devereux Weeks, Personal Liability of Public Officials 7 (Georgia, 4th ed 1988). See also

Butz v Economou, 438 US 478, 504 (1978).
13,457 US at 816.
140 Id at 818.
141 See, for example, Anderson v Creighton, 483 US 635, 641-42 n 3 (1987) ("Our hold-

ing today does not extend official qualified immunity beyond the bounds articulated in
Harlow . .

").
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reading Harlow and Rule 11 together, an attorney who did not satisfy Rule l1's reasonableness
standard probably would not satisfy
42
Harlow's, either.

In short, government attorneys whose conduct would subject
them to Rule 11 sanctions are not shielded from those sanctions
either by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, or by any form of
official immunity. Therefore, although the courts may not legally
impose Rule 11 sanctions on the government itself, they may sanction the government's attorneys individually.
III.

CONTROLLING THE .TRIAL BEHAVIOR OF GOVERNMENT ATTORNEYS WITHIN THE LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

The district courts possess significant safeguards to control the
government's trial behavior while remaining within the law as it is
outlined in the preceding Sections. First, as this Comment has argued, the most potent tool that the courts have to control the government's trial conduct may be Rule 11 sanctions levied against
government attorneys personally. This would both further the purposes of Rule 11 itself, and allow the court to retain considerable
leverage over government litigants. It would also avoid the sovereign immunity quandary discussed in Section I.
Of course, in some cases, the government's attorneys may not
be responsible for the sanctionable behavior. It may be members of
the represented agency or department who have misbehaved. " In
these cases, one could argue it would hardly be fair to visit the sins
of the bureaucracy upon its attorneys.
But, as discussed in Section II, Rule 11 holds attorneys personally responsible for the contents of filings that they sign; they
are to make a "reasonable inquiry" into the factual and legal foundations of all papers filed, and no special exceptions are made for
44
situations in which sanctionable behavior is ordered by a client.1
Nor are special exceptions made when government "clients" require attorneys to file unreasonable motions. As Judge Weinstein
wrote in Zimmerman, if the ordered conduct appears to violate
Rule 11, the government attorney simply should not act, or she will

141

Note, however, that the argument that "reasonable" may mean different things in

the qualified immunity and Rule 11 contexts may not be a frivolous one. In Anderson v
Creighton, the Court wrote that "reasonable" in the Fourth Amendment context and "reasonable" in the Harlow sense are not synonymous. 635 US at 643-44.
14 Johnson v Secretary, 587 F Supp 1117 (D DC 1984), would appear to be such a case.
For a discussion of Johnson, see text accompanying notes 149-51.
144 See text accompanying notes 107-12.
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be subject to sanctions under Rule 11.145 Personal responsibility of
the attorney is the very heart of Rule 11.146
Nevertheless, if one were convinced that it would be "unfair"
to hold a government attorney to the standard clearly dictated by
Rule 11, the court would remain free to impose non-monetary
sanctions under Rule 11 on the government itself. Nor are nonmonetary sanctions under Rule 11 a novel idea: the Rule leaves the
fashioning of an "appropriate sanction" to the trial court,1 41 and a
variety of non-monetary punishments have been imposed. 148 Indeed, some courts have already employed this tactic against the
government.
Consider, for example, Johnson v Secretary, which presented
a case of government agency misconduct. The court wrote that it
did not wish to "attack.

.

. the United States Attorney assigned to

this case." 14 9 Instead, it believed that the "egregious conduct" of
the defendant was the fault of the "vast bureaucracy of the Department of Health and Human Services.' 15 0 Therefore, invoking

its Rule 11 powers, the court chose to sanction the Department by
taking a number of disputed facts as established adversely to the
government. 15 ' This sanction surely had a deterrent effect on the
government. At the same time, it avoided both the sovereign immunity issue and the possible "unfairness" of sanctioning the attorney, while still compensating the plaintiff.
In a similar vein, one could imagine extending the reasoning of
Johnson even to judgment against the government. Although this
sanction has never been employd against the government under
Rule 11 in any reported case, it has been applied to private litigants and is theoretically available. 15 2 Even if rarely utilized, the
1'5 See note 107.
"146
See text accompanying notes 107-12.
147 FRCP 11. The Advisory Committee Notes also state that the court "has discretion
to tailor sanctions to the particular facts of the case."
148 The courts' power to "fashion an appropriate sanction" is not an empty formula;
their sanctions have included "issuing cautions or reprimands, requiring the circulation of
the court's Rule 11 opinion . . . ,referral to a bar association grievance committee or judicial disciplinary board, and suspension or disbarment from practice." See Wright and
Miller, Federal Practice at 117 (cited in note 72).
14 587 F Supp 1117, 1121-22 (D DC 1984).
150 Id at 1122.
151 Id at 1121. Unfortunately, the court did not explain why it chose this particular
form of sanction. Perhaps it was concerned about the sovereign immunity implications of
fining the government.
152 See Wright and Miller, FederalPractice at 117. Note, however, that while a majority of courts appear to believe that this is an appropriate sanction under Rule 11, some
disagreement remains. Id at 117 n 92.
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shadow of this severe sanction could be a potent deterrent to governmental violations of Rule 11. In short, non-monetary Rule 11
sanctions will leave courts with considerable influence over the
government itself, while respecting the limitations imposed by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Finally, a number of non-Rule 11 methods of controlling the
government's trial behavior are also open to the courts. Several
prominent commentators have argued that Rule 11 was entirely redundant because it did not grant district courts any powers that
they did not already have.15 Surely, the courts' civil contempt
power and extensive inherent powers give them additional leverage
over government litigants.5
It appears, then, that a two-tiered system of Rule 11 sanctions
that incorporates monetary sanctions against government attorneys and non-monetary sanctions against the government itself,
would leave the courts ample control over the government's trial
conduct. Indeed, the only "problem" with this system, compared to
the present practice in which courts apply monetary sanctions
against the government itself, may be an occasional failure to compensate opposing litigants who have been harmed by the government's sanctionable behavior.
But as argued in Section II, this objection simply proves too
much. The' fact that sovereign immunity leaves victims of government misconduct uncompensated in the Rule 11 context is simply
a truism: sovereign immunity leaves victims uncompensated by its
very nature. Furthermore, Rule 11 was not intended to be a make-

163 See Charles Schaffer, Sanctions:Rule 11 and Other Powers 16 (Schaffer & Sandler,
2d ed 1988); Charles A. Wright, letter to John B. Frank and Judge Mary M. Schroeder,
quoted in Jeffrey A. Parness, Groundless Pleadingsand Certifying Attorneys in the Federal Courts, 1985 Utah L Rev 325, 325 n 1 ("[Nlothing [in new Rule 11] . .. authorizes
courts to do things that they are not able to do and doing [or]... require[s] judges who do
not want to do these things to do so.").
124 Of course, 28 USC § 1927 and proceedings for violations of ethical norms might also
give the courts greater control over the behavior of government litigants; the problem, of
course, is that they are both directed against the government's attorneys, not the government itself. And, as Section II of this Comment argues, the government's attorneys are, in
any case, subject to Rule 11.
Note also that punitive sanctions awarded for civil contempt or under the statute might
be subject to the same sovereign immunity objections that exist in the Rule 11 context. See
In re Newlin, 29 Bankr 781, 786-87 (E D Pa 1983) (upholding a fee award, but not a contempt sanction, against IRS); Barry v Bowen, 884 F2d 442, 443 (9th Cir 1989) (invalidating
a fee award and stating "[nothing] suggests that the United States expressly has waived its
sovereign immunity with respect to contempt sanctions"). See also McBride v Coleman, 955
F2d 571, 576-77 (8th Cir 1992) (expressing "grave doubts" that the contempt power may be
used to award damages against the United States).
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whole remedy. Instead, the Court has repeatedly stressed that
"[t]he main objective of the Rule is not to reward parties. . . it is
'155
to deter baseless filings and curb abuses.
CONCLUSION

The position taken by this Comment-that the government
enjoys sovereign immunity from monetary sanctions under Rule
11-is uncomfortable, and almost sure to be unpopular. Certainly
the federal courts have not been receptive to it. At the same time,
however, this view best accords with the recent sovereign immunity jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. There can be little doubt
that Rule 11 may "plausibly" be interpreted as not waiving the
government's immunity, and therefore no waiver should be
recognized.
Still, current law permits a solution which protects against
abuses by governmental actors in litigation while respecting the
Supreme Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence. The courts
may maintain control over the government's trial behavior through
means legitimately at their disposal, including sanctions on government attorneys individually and non-monetary sanctions levied
against the government itself.

155 Business Guides, Inc. v Chromatic CommunicationsEnterprises,Inc., 111 S Ct 922,
934 (1991); see also Pavelic & LeFlore v Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 US 120, 126
(1989) ("[T]he purpose of [Rule 11] . . . is not reimbursement but 'sanction.' ").

